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UNREAL PROPERTY: VERNOR V. A UTODESK, INC.
AND THE RAPID EXPANSION OF COPYRIGHT
OWNERS' RIGHTS BY GRANTING BROAD
DEFERENCE TO SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
In a mountain cave near Malmb, Sweden, over 4,000 miles from
Washington, D.C., an array of computer servers broadcast a website
called thepiratebay.org.1 This website allows users to search a seem-
ingly limitless library of various media: everything from full versions
of popular and expensive software to films, television episodes, and
music. 2 Digital pirates all over the world can download the files that
they find through the website and copy them onto their computers'
hard drives.3 They rely not on terror or intimidation-like the tradi-
tional pirates of the high seas-but instead on an Internet connection.
Nearly half of all software pirating in the United States takes place in
only six states,4 but online piracy occurs in all parts of the country and
all over the world. In 2009, approximately forty percent of software
programs installed on personal computers around the world were pi-
rated.5 This is the equivalent of $51 billion in lost revenue for the
global software industry, a two percent increase from 2008.6 The
software pirated in the United States alone is valued at $8.4 billion.7
However, these numbers represent a mere fraction of the true cost of
online piracy as films, television episodes, and music are also copied
1. See The Pirate Bay Ships New Servers to Mountain Complex, TORRENT FREAK (May 16,
2011), http://torrentfreak.com/the-pirate-bay-ships-new-servers-to-mountain-complex-110516
(last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
2. See Browse Torrents, PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.org/browse (last visited Jan. 29,
2012).
3. See Ann Harrison, The Pirate Bay: Here to Stay?, WIRED (Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.wired.
com/science/discoveries/news/2006/03/70358?currentPage=all.
4. California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New York, and Texas account for 49.3% of software
piracy according to reports made to the Business Software Alliance in 2010. See Nicholas Jack-
son, Six States Responsible for Nearly Half of All Pirated Software, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2011, 3:53
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/04/six-states-responsible-for-nearly-
half-of-all-pirated-software/236978.
5. Bus. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, PIRACY IMPACT STUDY: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF REDUC-
ING SOFTWARE PIRACY (2010), available at http://portal.bsa.org/piracyimpact2010/studies/piracy
impactstudy2010.pdf.
6. Bus. SoFTWARE ALLIANCE, NEWS RELEASE: BSA REPORTS $51 BILLION WORTH OF
SOFTWARE THEFT IN 2009 (2010), available at http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2009/pr/pr-global.
pdf.
7. Id.
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en masse over the Internet. Modern piracy on the information super-
highway is much more economically dangerous than piracy on the
high seas because it happens extremely rapidly, on a very large scale,
and virtually anonymously.
Today, many producers of intellectual property are exposed to eco-
nomic harm caused by piracy.8 With the advent of broadband internet
connections, digital pirates are able to obtain pirated materials faster
and more easily than they previously could using older dial-up con-
nections. In order to protect companies from such exposure, courts
have expanded the rights of copyright owners while contracting the
rights of the owners of physical copies of copyrighted works; namely,
consumers. 9 This has not developed organically, but rather as a result
of significant investment in lobbying groups by producers of intellec-
tual property. 10 These lobbying groups work tirelessly to promote the
interests of intellectual property producers, pushing the development
of copyright law towards the goal of absolute control of intellectual
property by the copyright owner." These organizations, representing
the intellectual property industry, won a significant victory with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Vernor v.
Autodesk, Inc.12
Vernor arose when Timothy Vernor was prohibited from reselling a
copy of a computer program on eBay called AutoCAD.13 Autodesk,
Inc., the software company that developed AutoCAD, petitioned
eBay to remove Vernor's auctions, eventually resulting in the shut-
down of Vernor's eBay account.14 In response, Vernor filed a declara-
tory judgment action seeking a judicial determination that he was
legally permitted to resell a copy of the AutoCAD software.' 5 Vernor
initially prevailed in the district court but the decision was later over-
ruled by the Ninth Circuit, which promulgated a three-part test for
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
10. Examples of these lobbying groups include the Motion Picture Association of America
and the Software and Information Industry Association. See About Us, MonON PICrURE Ass'N
AM., http://www.mpaa.orglabout (last visited Nov. 12, 2011); SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUs. Ass'N,
http://www.siia.net/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=50&itemid=12 (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2011).
11. See, e.g., SIIA Member Programs & Resources, SOFTWARE & INFO. INDus. Ass'N, http://
www.siia.net/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=64&Itemid=23 (last visited Jan.
11, 2012).
12. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
13. Id. at 1105.
14. Id. at 1105-06.
15. Id. at 1106.
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determining ownership of copies of copyrighted works.16 This Note
discusses the inherent problems of abiding by such a rigid test and
argues that the approaches of other jurisdictions are preferable to the
Ninth Circuit's.
Part 1I of this Note addresses the background and development of
copyright law leading up to Vernor, focusing on the Ninth Circuit's
approach to the issue of ownership of copies of copyrighted works.17
Once that foundation has been laid, Part III then discusses Vernor in
detail.18 Part IV examines other courts' approaches to the question of
ownership.19 Specifically, it discusses the approaches of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Federal Circuits, and the Dis-
trict Court of Utah-which sits within the Tenth Circuit-and argues
that the Second and Federal Circuits' approaches are preferable to
that of the Ninth Circuit and the District of Utah. Part V of this Note
discusses the likely impact that Vernor will have on the software in-
dustry and other forms of intellectual property. 20 It identifies three
categories of effects: the contraction of the rights of consumers; the
potential expansion of the Vernor rule to forms of intellectual prop-
erty other than computer software; and the potential consumer back-
lash that would likely occur as a result.
II. BACKGROUND
Vernor is an important case because it narrowed the scope of two
significant defenses to copyright infringement: the first-sale doctrine
and the essential-step defense. While the implications of the Vernor
decision may be unsettling, its perceived necessity becomes under-
standable when balanced against the ever-expanding storm cloud of
piracy. The primary issue in Vernor was whether a possessor of a copy
of a copyrighted work is an owner of that copy or if that possessor has
only a license to use that copy. 21 In Vernor, the Ninth Circuit devel-
oped a rule that makes it easy for a computer-software copyright
owner to restrict ownership of the copies of their copyrighted work.22
The copyright owner can simply attach a software license agreement
to a product limiting the possessor's rights to that of a licensee instead
16. Id. at 1106, 1110-11, 1115.
17. See infra notes 21-72 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 73-114 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 115-63 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 164-202 and accompanying text.
21. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107.
22. See id. at 1111 ("We hold today that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a
copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license; (2) significantly
restricts the user's ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.").
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of an owner. However, Vernor did not arise out of a vacuum; rather,
it is the end result of a lengthy history of courts contracting the rights
of consumers of intellectual property. Thus, before one can under-
stand how the Vernor decision changed the concept of ownership in
the context of copyright law, one must first examine copyright law
generally.
A. Copyright Owners' Rights and Their Limitations
Copyright owners are entitled to certain enumerated rights pursu-
ant to the Copyright Act, 23 including the exclusive rights "to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies" 24 and "to distribute [those]
copies . . . under sale or other transfer of ownership." 25 However,
those rights have been narrowed since they were originally contem-
plated in the Copyright Act of 1790. The exclusive right to distribute
the copyrighted work is terminated after the first sale under the aptly
named "first-sale doctrine." 26 The copyright owner's exclusive right
to reproduce his copyrighted work is likewise narrowed in the context
of computer software by the essential-step defense. 27
1. The First-Sale Doctrine
The narrowing of a copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute
her copyrighted work began in the early twentieth century with
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute terminates after
the first sale.28 In Bobbs-Merrill, a book publisher sought injunctive
relief against Isidor and Nathan Straus for selling copies of a book it
published. 29 Bobbs-Merrill Company, the publisher, inserted a notice
in a book declaring that "[t]he price of this book at retail is one dollar
net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price ... ."30 The Strauses
purchased their entire inventory of the books directly from Bobbs-
Merrill. 3' They purchased ninety percent of the inventory wholesale
at a forty percent discount from the retail price and purchased the rest
at the full retail price.32 The Strauses then sold the books for eighty-
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
24. Id. § 106(1).
25. Id. § 106(3).
26. See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
28. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908).
29. Id. at 341.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 341-42.
32. Id.
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nine cents each. 3 3 The Court held that the Strauses were within their
rights to sell their copies of the book even though doing so was incon-
sistent with the notice inserted in the books and despite the copyright
owned by Bobbs-Merrill. 34 The Court reasoned that to hold other-
wise would be an overextension of the copyright owner's exclusive
right to distribute.35 Specifically, the Court stated:
To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all fu-
ture retail sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed
sum, would give a right not included in the terms of the statute, and,
in our view, extend its operation, by construction, beyond its mean-
ing, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legislative in-
tent in its enactment.3 6
This limitation on the copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute
her copyrighted work, commonly known as the first-sale doctrine, was
eventually codified as part of the Copyright Act.3 7 The Act provides
that "the owner of a particular copy [of a copyrighted work] . . . is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or other-
wise dispose of the possession of that copy."38
In 1998, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the first-sale
doctrine in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Interna-
tional, Inc. by determining that, because the statutory text only applies
to "owners" of a copy of a copyrighted work (or someone authorized
by that owner), "the first sale doctrine would not provide a defense
... [for] any nonowner such as a bailee, a licensee, a consignee, or one
whose possession of the copy was unlawful." 39 Thus, the Court drew a
distinction between a mere licensee of a copyrighted work and an ac-
tual owner of a copy of the copyrighted work, prohibiting the former
from reselling the copy while permitting the latter to do the same.
2. The Essential-Step Defense
A copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce his copyrighted
work likewise is not absolute. The Copyright Act defines copies as
"material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method . . . and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated."40 This definition becomes particularly problematic in the
33. Id. at 342.
34. See Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 351.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
38. Id.
39. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135. 146-47 (1998).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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context of digital software. In order to function properly, a computer
must make a copy of the digital information that constitutes any given
program or media file.4 1 Therefore, if enforced literally, the Copy-
right Act would proscribe the installation of all computer-software
programs. In order to protect users of lawfully purchased software
programs from exposure to copyright liability, Congress included the
essential-step defense as part of the Computer Software Copyright
Act in 1980.42 The essential-step defense permits "the owner of a
copy of a computer program to make . . . another copy . . . of that
computer program provided ... that such a new copy ... is created as
an essential step in the utilization of the computer program." 4 3 Like
the first-sale doctrine, the essential-step defense only serves as a
proper defense for the owners of copies of copyrighted material.
For some types of software, specifically operating systems, copying
the information to random access memory (RAM) occurs immedi-
ately after the computer is turned on, and as a result, it is impossible
to use the computer without making a copy of the digital information
that constitutes the operating system.44 This very issue arose in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc. There, a computer manufacturer, MAI Systems,
sought damages for copyright infringement against a third-party com-
puter-repair company, Peak Computer, for performing maintenance
on computers owned by the manufacturer's customers. 4 5 The court
held that "the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under
the Copyright Act." 4 6 Furthermore, agreeing with the district court,
the Ninth Circuit held that "[in the absence of ownership of the copy-
right or express permission by license, such acts constitute copyright
infringement." 47 MAI's license agreement only permitted its custom-
ers to copy the software onto a computer's RAM; when Peak serviced
their customer's computers, they went beyond the scope of that li-
41. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting
that a computer, in order to process and view digital materials, must make a copy of the digital
information from the computer's hard drive to the computer's RAM).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a).
43. Id.
44. An operating system is the software on a computer that coordinates the use and access of
all other software and information stored on that computer. A computer cannot function with-
out some sort of operating-system software. Popular examples of operating systems include
Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7, Mac OSX, and less commonly, Linux/Unix. See gen-
erally Desktop PC Buying Guide, NEwEGG.COM, http://www.newegg.com/Product/Category
IntelligenceArticle.aspx?articleld=197 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
45. MA! Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 513.
46. Id. at 519.
47. Id. at 518.
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cense because Peak, as a third party, was not licensed by MAI to
make the copy. 48 Further, because a license is nontransferable, MAI's
customers could not authorize Peak to service their own computers. 49
MAI Systems is an early example of the Ninth Circuit's tendency to
grant broad deference to the software license agreements attached to
software by its developers.
B. Copyright Infringement Versus Breach of Contract
Software license agreements are attached to almost all modern
software sold in the United States.5 0 These agreements are not typi-
cally negotiated, but rather included as boilerplate attached to the
product, and a refusal to accept the terms of the agreement will pro-
hibit the user from operating the software.51  In such a situation, a
question inevitably arises regarding whether a violation of a software
license agreement is a breach of contract or if it is instead a copyright
infringement. The Ninth Circuit has determined that "[g]enerally, a
'copyright owner who grants a nonexclusive license to use his copy-
righted material waives his right to sue the licensee for copyright in-
fringement' and can sue only for breach of contract."5 2 As a result,
the Ninth Circuit has promulgated a two-part test for determining
when a cause of action for copyright infringement is proper in place of
a cause of action for breach of contract.53 First, the licensee must act
beyond the terms of a license that is limited in scope.5 4 Second, the
licensor must demonstrate that the limitations of the agreement that
were allegedly exceeded are "limitations on the scope of the license
rather than independent contractual covenants."55 The first prong of
48. Id. at 517.
49. Id.
50. Any individual who has had even minimal exposure to computer software is familiar with
the obligatory license agreements one must accept before using the same.
51. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL
2757357, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008).
52. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998)). The distinction between a cause of action
for breach of contract and a cause of action for copyright infringement is significant insofar as
the damages that the plaintiff is able to recover are dramatically different. MDY Indus., 2008
WL 2757357, at *3 n.4 ("Breach of contract damages generally are limited to the value of the
actual loss caused by the breach. Copyright damages, by contrast, include the copyright owner's
actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, or statutory damages as high as
$150,000 per infringed work." (citation omitted)).
53. See Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 1121-22.
54. Id. at 1121.
55. Id. at 1122 ("In other words, before [the licensor] can gain the benefits of copyright en-
forcement, it must definitively establish that the rights it claims were violated are copyright, not
contractual, rights.").
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this test is not difficult for software developers to satisfy. In MD Y
Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., for example, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona relied heavily on the simple
fact that the software license agreement attached to Blizzard En-
tertainment's product was titled "Grant of Limited Use License." 56
For purposes of fulfilling the second prong, the court relied heavily on
the language of the agreement itself to determine which terms were
limitations on the scope of the license and which terms were contrac-
tual covenants.5 7
C. Software License Agreements as Contracts of Adhesion
Software license agreements can be characterized as contracts of
adhesion that, while unsavory, are nevertheless enforceable.58 Con-
tracts of adhesion are "form contracts offered on a take-or-leave basis
by a party with stronger bargaining power to a party with weaker
power." 59 The general rule is "that courts will enforce the terms of a
contract as written," but "courts traditionally have reviewed with
heightened scrutiny the terms of contracts of adhesion." 60 Courts are
willing to make exceptions to the general acceptance of the contract as
written in situations where the terms are unreasonable. 61 However,
the test for determining the unreasonableness of a contract of adhe-
sion "is not simple, nor can it be mechanically applied." 62 Rather,
"the primary concern must be with the terms of the contract consid-
ered in light of the circumstances existing when the contract was
made." 63 In other words, the determination of whether a contract of
adhesion is enforceable is based on a largely contextual test that
grants wide discretion to a court in determining what is "reasonable"
under the circumstances.
56. See MDY Indus., 2008 WL 2757357, at *4. The District of Arizona was also persuaded by
the fact that the license agreement refers to itself as a "limited, non-exclusive license" and that
all use of the product is subject to the software license agreement. Id.
57. See id. at *5-6.
58. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (holding that a forum selec-
tion clause in a form contract was enforceable).
59. Id. at 600 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
62. Id. at 450.
63. Id.
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D. The Ninth Circuit's Influence on the Development of Intellectual
Property Law
It is in the above-described environment of software license agree-
ments as related to copyright law that the Ninth Circuit decided Ver-
nor v. Autodesk, Inc.6 4 Before discussing the specifics of Vernor, it
should be noted that the Ninth Circuit is an extremely influential juris-
diction in the development of intellectual property law, particularly
that relating to the digital-software industry. This is the result of the
confluence of two factors. First, the Ninth Circuit is the single largest
appellate jurisdiction in the country and comprises approximately
twenty percent of the nation's population. 65 By comparison, the next
most populous appellate jurisdiction is the Eleventh Circuit, with a
population roughly half the size of the Ninth Circuit. 66 Second, states
within the Ninth Circuit, particularly California and Washington, are
home to a vast array of American software and technology
companies. 67
In a 2006 study, William K. Ford conducted a study of intellectual
property casebooks and judicial decisions.68 He found that the Sec-
ond Circuit was traditionally the most influential circuit court in terms
of copyright and intellectual property law, "consistently publish[ing]
at least 31.3% of the copyright opinions from the 1890s through the
1970s, more than any other circuit by wide margins." 69 However, by
the 1980s, the Ninth Circuit overtook the Second Circuit in terms of
volume of opinions.70 "While the Second Circuit moved back into the
lead in the 1990s ..... [f]rom 2000 to 2004, the Ninth Circuit again
overtook the Second Circuit, with the Second Circuit's share dropping
below 20% for the first time."7 ' Considering the Ninth Circuit's vast
population as well as the number of technology companies based
64. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
65. The nine states that make up the Ninth Circuit are Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. Population data was taken from the U.S.
Census Bureau and is an estimate of the population of the several states as of July 1, 2009.
Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto
Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2009), http://www.census.gov/
popest/states/NST-ann-est.html.
66. The Eleventh Circuit is comprised of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.
67. Washington is home to many technology companies, the largest being Microsoft. Califor-
nia is home to even more, including Adobe Systems, Apple, and Google.
68. See William K. Ford, Judging Expertise in Copyright Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 24
(2006).
69. Id. at 41.
70. Id.
71. Id.
2012] 947
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
within its jurisdiction, this trend shows little sign of reversing anytime
soon.72
III. SUBJECT OPINION: VERNOR v. AUTODESK, INC.
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
Vernor arose out of a dispute between Timothy Vernor and
Autodesk, Inc., a software developer based in California.73 Autodesk
developed a program called AutoCAD, a popular drafting program
commonly used by engineers and architects. 74 One of Autodesk's cus-
tomers, Caldwell/Thomas & Associates, Inc. (CTA), used a version of
the AutoCAD program, Release 14, in its business.75 CTA then up-
graded to a newer version of AutoCAD, AutoCAD 2000.76 Because
CTA had already purchased Release 14, Autodesk offered a reduced
price for the AutoCAD 2000 licenses.77 The software license agree-
ment outlining the terms of use for AutoCAD 2000 required licensees
to destroy previous versions of the software upon upgrading.78 How-
ever, instead of destroying its copies of Release 14, CTA sold them to
Vernor at an office sale, attaching to the packaging handwritten notes
containing the activation codes required to install and use the
software. 79 Once in possession of the secondhand copies of Release
14, Vernor attempted to sell them on eBay.80 Vernor never opened
the packaging or installed the software.81 Consequently, Vernor never
agreed to the attached software license agreement. 82
Vernor derived substantial income from selling goods on eBay.83
Over the course of his eBay career, he sold over 10,000 items.84 Prior
to purchasing the four copies of Release 14 from CTA, Vernor had
actually purchased a separate copy of the same version of Release 14
72. See id.
73. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1105.
76. Id.
77. A new license for AutoCAD 2000 would have cost CTA $3,750. Id. However, because
CTA was upgrading from a previous version, each license for the upgraded AutoCAD 2000 cost
only $495. Id.
78. Autodesk even retained a right to be furnished with proof of the destruction of the previ-
ous versions upon request. Id.
79. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1105.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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from an unspecified seller at a garage sale in May of 2005.85 When he
attempted to sell this copy on eBay, Autodesk filed a "take-down no-
tice" pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 86
This notice prompted eBay to remove the allegedly infringing sale
from its website.87 However, Vernor filed a "counter-notification" 88
with eBay, contesting the validity of Autodesk's copyright infringe-
ment claim.89 Autodesk never replied to the counter-notification, and
as a result, eBay reinstated Vernor's auction, permitting him to sell
the copy of AutoCAD.90 About two years later, in April 2007, Vernor
attempted to sell the copies of Release 14 he purchased from CTA on
eBay one at a time.91
The first three copies Vernor sold underwent the same DMCA pro-
cess as the 2005 sale: Autodesk would file a take-down notice; eBay
would remove the auction; Vernor would file a counter-notification;
Autodesk would not respond; and eBay would reinstate the auction. 92
When Vernor attempted to sell the fourth copy, Autodesk again filed
a take-down notice, only this time eBay suspended Vernor's entire
account because of Autodesk's repeated complaints.93 Vernor again
filed a counter-notification, to which Autodesk did not respond, and
he even wrote a letter to Autodesk indicating that he was entitled to
sell the copies of AutoCAD. 94 In response to the letter, Autodesk's
attorneys sent a letter to Vernor directing him to stop selling the
software.95 However, because Autodesk failed to respond to Vernor's
counter-notification, eBay reinstated Vernor's account. 96 At that
time, Vernor's account had been suspended for one month, precluding
him from earning any income from selling items on eBay.97 Vernor
filed a declaratory judgment action against Autodesk in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington seeking damages
85. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1105.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1105 & n.3.
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3) (2006). The DMCA provides that an individual who is issued a
take-down notice may file a counter-notification in which he must include, among other things,
"[a] statement under penalty of perjury that [he] has a good faith belief that the material was
removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification of the material to be removed or
disabled." Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1105 n.3.
89. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1105 & n.3.
90. Id. at 1105-06.
91. Id. at 1106.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1106.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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and injunctive relief. Vernor argued that he was entitled to sell the
remaining copies of AutoCAD under the first-sale doctrine.98 Follow-
ing discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment,
and the district court held "that Vernor's sales were non-infringing
under the first sale doctrine and the essential step defense." 99
Autodesk appealed. 00
B. The Vernor Test
The Ninth Circuit wrestled primarily with the question of whether
CTA was the owner of the four copies of AutoCAD for purposes of
the first-sale doctrine and essential-step defense. 101 The court held
that CTA was not an owner, but rather a mere licensee of the copies
of AutoCAD.102 Consequently, Vernor was likewise not the owner of
the copy because CTA, as a licensee, was unable to transfer its license
rights to Vernor.103 In determining that CTA was a licensee and not
an owner, the Ninth Circuit promulgated a three-part test to be ap-
plied specifically to software users. 104 The Ninth Circuit's test states
that "a software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy
where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a li-
cense; (2) significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer the
software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions." 0 5 Relying en-
tirely on the text of the AutoCAD software license agreement at-
tached to the software, the Ninth Circuit found that Autodesk
sufficiently met each of the three parts and, as a result, that CTA was
not the owner of the four copies it sold to Vernor.106 Because CTA
was not the owner of those copies, it could not transfer ownership to
Vernor, as it had no right to do so under the first-sale doctrine. 107
Consequently, because Vernor never received ownership rights from
CTA, he likewise could not transfer ownership to his customers on
eBay. 108 Thus, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of
summary judgment and held that Vernor was not entitled to resell the
copies under the first-sale doctrine and that he could not assert the
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107.
102. Id. at 1111.
103. Id. at 1112.
104. See id. at 1111.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1112.
108. Id.
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essential-step defense on behalf of his customers. 109 Vernor was
therefore prohibited from installing the software.
Soon after deciding Vernor, the Ninth Circuit applied the Vernor
test to Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., a dispute between corporate giant
Apple and a small computer manufacturer.'1o In the Apple case, Ap-
ple brought a copyright infringement action because Psystar had in-
stalled copies of Apple's proprietary operating system, Mac OS X,
onto computers that Psystar manufactured.' Apple argued that in-
stalling the operating system on non-Apple-manufactured computers
was an unauthorized copying in violation of its software license agree-
ment and Apple's copyright. 112 Psystar, on the other hand, argued
that it was the owner of its copies of Mac OS X pursuant to the first-
sale doctrine because it had purchased retail-packaged copies of the
operating system and, consequently, was not in violation of Apple's
copyright. 13 The court applied the Vernor test and found that Psystar
was not the owner, but rather a licensee pursuant to Apple's software
license agreement for Mac OS X.114
IV. ANALYSIS
Not all courts agree with the Ninth Circuit's perspective on the issue
of ownership of copies of copyrighted works. The Second Circuit, for
example, has different tests for determining ownership and for deter-
mining when copying intellectual property is considered "copying"
under copyright law." 5 The Federal Circuit likewise differs from the
Ninth Circuit on the issue of whether a licensee can also be an owner
of her copy of a copyrighted work.116 The Ninth Circuit seems to say
that all licensees are, as a matter of law, not owners, whereas the Fed-
eral Circuit applies a looser test. A minority of jurisdictions, including
109. Id.
110. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011).
111. Id. at 1153.
112. Id. at 1153-54.
113. Id. at 1159.
114. Id.
The Mac OS X [software icense agreement], states that the software is "licensed, not
sold, to [the customer] by Apple Inc. (Apple) for use only under the terms of this
License." Thus the [software license agreement] provides that Apple "retain[s] owner-
ship of the Apple Software itself." The [software license agreement] also imposes sig-
nificant use and transfer restrictions, providing, inter alia, that a licensee may only run
one copy and "may not rent, lease, lend, redistribute or sublicense the Apple
Software." The license thus satisfied Vernor's three factor test for demonstrating the
existence of a licensor/licensee relationship.
Id. (second and fourth alterations in original) (citation omitted).
115. See infra notes 118-45 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
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the District of Utah, view the issue of ownership to be entirely and
solely dependent on whether the individual in question has possession
of a copy of a copyrighted work.'17 As a result of these inconsisten-
cies, it is likely that the Supreme Court will need to decide the issue in
order to provide uniformity to this area of law.
A. The Second Circuit's Approach
The Second Circuit was traditionally the most influential federal ap-
pellate court in the arena of copyright law, but has been recently
eclipsed by the Ninth Circuit.118 Consequently, it is particularly useful
to begin the analysis of differences among the appellate courts with a
discussion of the Second Circuit's approach. The Second Circuit uses
a test it developed in Krause v. Titleserv, Inc. to determine whether
the possessor of a copy of a copyrighted work is an owner or licensee
for purposes of applying the first-sale doctrine or the essential-step
defense.119 In Krause, a dispute arose between an employer, Titleserv,
and its employee, William Krause.120 Krause was employed as a com-
puter programmer for Titleserv, and he wrote over thirty-five com-
puter programs for the company over the course of his ten-year
employment.121
Krause terminated his relationship with Titleserv in 1996.122 When
he left, Krause indicated that Titleserv was free to continue using his
programs in their current state, but that the company had no right to
modify his programs' source code.123 Unfortunately for Titleserv, in
order to accomplish many of the routine functions of the software-
like adding a new client, changing the address of an existing client, or
fixing common bugs from time to time-Titleserv had to modify the
source code. 124 In order to prevent them from doing so, Krause
"locked" the executable code in such a way that Titleserv could not
decompile the executable code back into the source code that they
needed in order to make the desired changes.125 This effectively ren-
dered Krause's programs unusable and unmaintainable for Titleserv
117. See infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
118. See Ford, supra note 68, at 41.
119. See Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119. 122-24 (2d Cir. 2005).
120. Id. at 120-21.
121. Id. at 120.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 121.
124. Id.
125. Krause, 402 F.3d at 120-21. Source code is converted into executable code through a
compiler. Executable code can be converted back into source code by means of a decompiler.
Id.
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until the company was able to circumvent the lock, access the source
code, and subsequently modify the source code. 126 In response to
Titleserv's circumvention of his lock, Krause filed suit for copyright
infringement.12 7
The outcome of the case hinged on whether Titleserv was the owner
of the copies of Krause's copyrighted software for purposes of the es-
sential-step defense.128 The Second Circuit held that Titleserv was the
owner of the copies of Krause's copyrighted works and that modifying
the source code was an essential step in the utilization of the pro-
grams, thus excusing Titleserv from any liability for copyright infringe-
ment.129 The court further held that in order to determine whether a
possessor of a copy of a copyrighted work is an owner of that copy,
"courts should inquire into whether the party exercises sufficient inci-
dents of ownership."1 30
1. The Second Circuit's Sufficient-Incidents-of-Ownership Test
The sufficient-incidents-of-ownership test is markedly different
from the Ninth Circuit's Vernor test. The Second Circuit relied on a
variety of factors to determine whether Titleserv's conduct amounted
to sufficient incidents of ownership:
Titleserv paid Krause substantial consideration to develop the pro-
grams for its sole benefit. Krause customized the software to serve
Titleserv's operations. The copies were stored on a server owned by
Titleserv. Krause never reserved the right to repossess the copies
used by Titleserv and agreed that Titleserv had the right to continue
to possess and use the programs forever, regardless whether its rela-
tionship with Krause terminated. Titleserv was similarly free to dis-
card or destroy the copies any time it wished.' 3'
The Ninth Circuit's Vernor test, on the other hand, relies on only
three factors, each of which is wholly dependent on the copyright
owner's actions.132 While the Vernor test places all of its elements
under the control of the copyright owner, the Second Circuit's test is
much more broad and malleable, allowing courts some room for
discretion.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 122.
129. Id. at 124-26.
130. Id. at 124.
131. Krause, 402 F.3d at 124.
132. As mentioned above, the Vernor test indicates "that a software user is a licensee rather
than an owner of a copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a
license; (2) significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes nota-
ble use restrictions." Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
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It is true, however, that there is a certain degree of overlap between
the two tests. In Krause, the Second Circuit relied on the fact that
Krause did not place any limits on the length of time that Titleserv
could possess the software, did not prohibit Titleserv from disposing
of the software in any way it saw fit, and never reserved the right to
repossess the software. 133 These three considerations could be inter-
preted as insufficient to satisfy the Vernor test's second and third ele-
ments, which require that the copyright owner "significantly restrict[ ]
the user's ability to transfer the software" and "impose[ ] notable use
restrictions" on the user.134 Accordingly, if the Second Circuit were to
apply the Vernor test to the facts of Krause, it would likely have
reached the same decision.
However, Krause could have prevailed on the first element of the
Vernor test, the requirement that the copyright owner specify that a
software user is a licensee rather than an owner.135 Although no facts
in Krause indicate that Krause expressly specified Titleserv as a
licensee, he may have done so by implication. Krause told Titleserv
that they were "free to continue using the executable code as it ex-
isted on the day [he] left, but asserted that Titleserv had no right to
modify the source code."136 Similarly, a homeowner who permits a
neighbor's child to play on the homeowner's yard, while simultane-
ously prohibiting the child from modifying the yard in any way, may
not have expressly indicated that he had granted the child a license,
but nevertheless did so by implication.
This does not suggest that Krause would have necessarily prevailed
had the Second Circuit applied the Vernor test to his case. As dis-
cussed above, Krause would not likely have met the second and third
elements of the Vernor test. This does, however, illustrate the danger
of the elemental nature of the Vernor test. By developing such a rigid
test, the Ninth Circuit has limited itself in a way that the Second Cir-
cuit has not. The Ninth Circuit's test is based entirely on the actions
of the copyright owner; specifically, the test contemplates only the
terms of use that the copyright owner has imposed on the users of its
copyrighted material.13 7 Alternatively, the Second Circuit's more
flexible sufficient-incidents-of-ownership test allows the court to mod-
ify a decision, in its discretion, should it encounter a unique set of
133. Krause, 402 F.3d at 124.
134. Vernor. 621 F.3d at 1111.
135. Id.
136. Krause, 402 F.3d at 121.
137. See Vernor. 621 F.3d. at 1111.
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circumstances.' 38 In other words, the Second Circuit, unlike the Ninth
Circuit, may look beyond the terms set out by the copyright owner to
the actual circumstances of the situation.
2. The Second Circuit's Approach to "Copying" Under the
Copyright Act
Apart from the rule regarding ownership of a copy of copyrighted
material, the Second Circuit also differs from the Ninth regarding the
definition of "copying" for purposes of the essential-step defense.
The Second Circuit takes issue with the Ninth Circuit's determination
"that the loading of software into [a computer's] RAM creates a copy
under the Copyright Act."1 39 Although the Ninth Circuit in MAI Sys-
tems never expressly stated that copying software into RAM was nec-
essarily copying under the Copyright Act, subsequent cases have
supported such an interpretation. 14 0 However, in Cartoon Network
LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., the Second Circuit "construe[d] MAI Sys-
tems and its progeny as holding that loading a program into a com-
puter's RAM can result in copying that program."141 The court went
on to say that it "[did] not read MAI Systems as holding that, as a
matter of law, loading a program into a form of RAM always results
in copying." 142
Much like the above comparison between the sufficient-incidents-
of-ownership test and the Vernor test, the Ninth Circuit again applies
a strict, elemental rule to an issue the Second Circuit views as best
handled through discretion. In Cartoon Network, the Second Circuit
held that, at least in the specific set of circumstances, copying a televi-
sion program to a digital video recording device's RAM did not con-
stitute copying under the Copyright Act because the data did not
remain "for a period of more than transitory duration."1 43 Rather,
"each bit of data . . . [was] rapidly and automatically overwritten as
soon as it [was] processed." 144 Had the Second Circuit applied the
Ninth Circuit's more rigid and inflexible rule-that copying informa-
138. See Krause, 402 F.3d at 124.
139. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993).
140. See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769,785-86 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the defendant was licensed to run the plaintiff's program from RAM, but not
licensed to copy the entirety of the program onto its computers' hard drives because the latter
was not an essential step); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the defendant's copying of the plaintiff's program into RAM constituted copying
under the Copyright Act).
141. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 2008).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 129-30.
144. Id. at 130.
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tion to a computer's RAM is always copying for purposes of the
Copyright Act-the opposite outcome would have occurred. 145
B. The Federal Circuit's Approach
The Ninth Circuit's decision in MAI Systems stands for the idea that
a licensee is inherently a nonowner. 146 This dichotomy-that a party
must be either an owner or a licensee-is solidified in the Ninth Cir-
cuit's Vernor test, as it always must result in a finding of either an
owner or a licensee.147 The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, dis-
agrees with this approach. Instead, the Federal Circuit holds that "a
party who purchases copies of software from the copyright owner can
hold a license under a copyright while still being an 'owner' of a copy
of the copyrighted software for purposes of [the essential-step de-
fense]."1 48 Like the Second Circuit, the Federal Circuit allows for
flexibility in its rule, permitting the court to exercise discretion when
proper.
C. The District of Utah's Approach
The danger of a court limiting itself to absolute rules is illustrated
well by the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah's decision in
Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Center, Inc.149 As a district court sitting
within the Tenth Circuit, it is not bound by the Ninth Circuit's prece-
dent. In Novell, the District of Utah held that the purchaser of
software was "an 'owner' by way of sale and entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the software with the same rights as exist in the
purchase of any other good."150 The court added "that software users
generally purchase the software through a retailer and consider the
transaction as complete once the exchange of the software package is
made at the register for the money." 5 1 Consequently, the court rea-
soned that it would be unfair to bind the purchaser to additional terms
of use in the form of a software license agreement if the purchaser had
not originally bargained for such restrictions.15 2 This necessarily sug-
gests that any possessor-or at least any purchaser-of software has
145. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993).
146. Id. at 518 n.5 ("Since MAI licensed its software, the Peak customers do not qualify as
'owners' of the software and are not eligible for protection under [the essential-step defense].").
147. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
148. DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
149. Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Utah 1997).
150. Id. at 1230.
151. Id. at 1230 n.17.
152. See id.
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full ownership rights regardless of the terms of the software license
agreement.
As a result, copyright owners in the District of Utah are completely
disenfranchised of their ability to restrict a user's exercise of the first-
sale doctrine and the essential-step defense. Because a purchaser is
always an owner in the District of Utah, it necessarily follows that any
purchaser will always be able to both transfer her copy of the copy-
righted work and make a copy of that work, if making the copy is "an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program."15 3 This is
particularly problematic in the context of computer software simply
due to how it is utilized by consumers. For example, a consumer may
purchase a copy of a software program on a compact disc. In the Dis-
trict of Utah, this consumer becomes an owner of that copy by virtue
of his purchase and possession.1 5 4 The owner is permitted to copy the
information from the compact disc onto the hard drive of his com-
puter because making that copy is an essential step in the utilization of
the program.1 55 At that point, the consumer would be in possession of
two copies of the program, and consequently, the consumer would
also be an owner of both copies. As an owner of both copies, the
consumer is free to sell the copy on the compact disc to a friend pursu-
ant to the first-sale doctrine. 156 Pursuant to that transfer, the friend
would acquire all of the ownership rights that the original consumer
enjoyed.' 57 Thus, the friend would be free to make a copy by install-
ing it onto his computer-just as the original consumer had done-
and then sell the copy stored on the compact disc to yet another
friend. The danger is that a consumer could make copies of a copy-
righted work and then distribute them freely without ever committing
copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, making copyright
protections for creators of original works inconsequential.
D. The Danger of a Nondiscretionary Rule
The District of Utah's strict application of a nondiscretionary rule is
dangerous because it allows a consumer to circumvent the Copyright
Act's protections against piracy. The Ninth Circuit's Vernor test, sit-
153. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006) (providing that an "owner" of a copy of a copyrighted
work always has the right to make a copy of her copy if making that copy is an essential step in
the utilization of the copyrighted work); id. § 109(a) (providing that an "owner" of a copy of a
copyrighted work has the right to resell that copy, without consent from the copyright owner,
after making the first purchase).
154. See Novell, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
155. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1).
156. See id. § 109(a).
157. See id.
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ting on the other end of the spectrum, is similarly dangerous.
Whereas the District of Utah's approach undermines a copyright
owner's protections against piracy, the Ninth Circuit's approach em-
phatically requires strict enforcement of software license agree-
ments.158 As discussed above, the rigid nature of the Vernor test
makes it very difficult for a possessor of a copy of a copyrighted work
to claim ownership over that copy. The reason for this difficulty lies in
the fact that the Ninth Circuit must grant broad deference to the
terms of the license agreement that the copyright owner attached to
the software.15 9 Under the Vernor test, each of the three elements is
entirely dependent on the copyright owner's discretion. Put another
way, the copyright owner may unilaterally craft the software license
agreement in such a way that the court must necessarily come to the
determination that the possessor is a licensee and not an owner. For
example, a copyright owner may include a term indicating that the
consumer's license to use the software is revoked thirty days after
purchase unless the consumer pays an additional fee. The impact of
this hypothetical term, or any similar term, is unsettling.
Due to the rigid nature of the Vernor test, the Ninth Circuit would
be bound to enforce such a term because a licensee's rights to use the
software are entirely dependent on the terms of the license that the
copyright owner granted to that licensee. Because the Vernor test is
limited to three nondiscretionary prongs, when unique circumstances
arise-for example, when a copyright owner drafts an abusive term in
a license agreement-the Ninth Circuit will have little flexibility to
employ its own discretion. Thus, the consumer could potentially be
bound by an extortive license agreement; after all, his ownership
rights to the copy are wholly dependent on the terms of the license
agreement that the copyright owner has drafted. In short, neither the
District of Utah's approach nor the Ninth Circuit's approach is desira-
ble because each one represents an extreme on either side of a broad
spectrum.
E. The Supreme Court and a More Balanced Approach
If the Supreme Court addresses the problem of ownership of intel-
lectual property, it should disregard the two extreme approaches out-
lined above. 160 Instead, the Court should employ a more flexible
158. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
159. See id. 1111-12.
160. The Supreme Court will not, however, be deciding this issue in the context of the Vernor
case because it denied Timothy Vernor's petition for certiorari on October 3, 2011. Vernor v.
Autodesk, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 105 (2011). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court will have to address the
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standard such as the ones employed by the Second or Federal Circuits.
The Court should reach this decision by balancing the countervailing
interests of the software industry and the software consumer. The
software industry has a strong interest in protecting against piracy,
and as such, the District of Utah's approach would be undesirable.
Conversely, the consumer has a strong interest in getting what she
bargains for and likewise must be protected against predatory agree-
ments that may bind her at the time of purchase, regardless of
whether she expressly agrees to the terms. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's
Vernor test is undesirable for protecting the interests of consumers.
The Second Circuit's sufficient-incidents-of-ownership test is a
happy medium between these two extremes. As applied in the Krause
case, the sufficient-incidents-of-ownership test permits the copyright
owner to impose reasonable restrictions on the use of its copyrighted
work while simultaneously providing a check on the extent of those
restrictions. 16 1 The check is found in the relatively discretionary na-
ture of the test; it requires only that the possessor "exercise[ ] suffi-
cient incidents of ownership over a copy of the program to be sensibly
considered the owner of the copy." 162 As a result, the Second Cir-
cuit's test serves both of the countervailing interests that the Supreme
Court would have to protect. It does so by permitting the decision
maker substantial discretion in determining when a purchaser is an
"owner" of a copy of a copyrighted work under the Copyright Act. 1 6 3
This discretion simultaneously protects the software industry from
piracy and protects consumers from abusive practices by allowing the
decision maker the freedom to dismiss potentially abusive license
terms drafted by the software industry.
Nevertheless, as the Ninth Circuit is one of the most influential ju-
risdictions in the field of intellectual property law, the Supreme Court
may likely find it persuasive. If the Supreme Court does adopt the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Vernor, several undesirable consequences
would result.
V. IMPACT
Three categories of undesirable consequences would likely arise if
the Supreme Court were to adopt the Ninth Circuit's Vernor test.
issue eventually due to the inconsistent rules that are present among the federal circuits. See
supra notes 118-57 and accompanying text.
161. See Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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First, the rights of consumers would likely be contracted.164 Second,
courts could easily apply the Vernor test to other forms of intellectual
property despite its specific application to computer software. 165
Lastly, the contraction of consumers' ownership rights, combined with
the likely expansion of the Vernor test, could create a potential for
consumer backlash, particularly against the software industry. 66
A. The Contraction of Consumers' Ownership Rights
As consumers are increasingly held to be licensees of the products
that they buy rather than owners of those products, their fundamental
property right of alienation is reduced. This result is precisely what
the Supreme Court intended to prevent when it created the first-sale
doctrine at the turn of twentieth century. The first-sale doctrine was
created in order to strike a balance between the intellectual property
rights of the copyright owner and the fundamental property rights of
the consumer.167 Vernor tips this delicate balance in favor of copy-
right owners, and the unintended results may be far-reaching and
significant.
Particularly, the restriction on consumers' right to alienate their
property will have its biggest effect on secondary markets for copy-
righted works. These markets include everything from the more tradi-
tional used-book stores to the more modern arena of online auction
sites such as eBay.com or uBid.com. In its amicus brief filed on behalf
of Mr. Vernor, eBay expressed concerns that a contraction of the first-
sale doctrine would have a chilling effect on these secondary
markets.168
Secondary markets serve two important functions for consumers.169
First, they expand consumers' opportunity to purchase copies of copy-
righted works, often at a lower price, because they need not purchase
them directly from the copyright owner.170 Second, the availability of
a secondary market decreases the cost of new copies of a copyrighted
164. See infra notes 167-84 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
167. See Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc'ns, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir.
2007) ("The first sale doctrine ensures that the copyright monopoly does not intrude on the
personal property rights of the individual owner, given that the law generally disfavors restraints
of trade and restraints on alienation.").
168. See Brief of Amicus Curiae eBay Inc. in Support of Appellee at 2-3, Vernor v. Autodesk,
Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-35969), 2010 WL 894741 [hereinafter Brief of eBay
Inc.].
169. Id. at 7; see also R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Net-
works, 44 B.C. L. REv. 577, 578 (2003).
170. Brief of eBay Inc., supra note 168, at 7; Reese, supra note 169, at 586.
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work in the long run because the initial purchaser may recoup the cost
of a new copy by reselling it to a new consumer and thereby increases
the likelihood that the new copies will be purchased.171 As a result,
secondary markets facilitate economic efficiency in distributing copy-
righted works, resulting in a wider range of consumers having access
to those copyrighted works than would otherwise be possible. 172
Furthermore, secondary markets increase the longevity of a copy-
righted work because the original producer need not perpetually man-
ufacture it in order for any given consumer to have access to it.173
After all, if a vibrant secondary market exists, any modern consumer
can legitimately purchase from a vast library of intellectual property
works because of broad access to the Internet and the ease of commu-
nication that it creates.174
In short, "secondary markets create important opportunities."17 5
Particularly during difficult economic times, secondary markets (by
virtue of the first-sale doctrine) grant the typical consumer broader
access to intellectual property works than would otherwise be availa-
ble. 176 This promotes two important public interests. First, broad ac-
cess to intellectual property increases access to a variety of
information and ideas. This interest, while intangible, is nevertheless
essential to the existence of a healthy democracy. In order to have a
thoughtful and engaged citizenry, the State ought to facilitate access
to knowledge and information. This fundamental interest-the exis-
tence of a public domain and the public's access to it-is one that the
Copyright Act intended to protect. 177
171. See Brief of eBay Inc., supra note 168, at 7; see also John A. Rothchild, The Incredible
Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERs L. REV. 1. 79 (2004).
172. See Brief of eBay Inc., supra note 168, at 7-8; see also Nancy S. Kim, The Software Li-
censing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103, 1161.
173. Brief of eBay, Inc., supra note 168, at 9; Reese, supra note 169, at 592.
174. See Brief of eBay Inc., supra note 168, at 9 ("Together, the first sale doctrine and secon-
dary markets expand the window during which copies [of copyrighted works] circulate publicly,
contributing to the preservation and survival of works over time." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. PHILIP S. ASHLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY 627 (2010).
Congress believed that granting a temporary monopoly to authors and inventors would
stimulate a higher level of creative output, innovation and ingenuity than would other-
wise occur, and that the public would ultimately be the beneficiaries; because during
the monopoly period the public could enjoy the work by paying for it, and after the
expiration of the copyright or patent, these works would pass into the public domain
where they could then be freely exploited forever.
Id.
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The Constitution grants Congress the power "to promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."17 8 This speaks to the second important public inter-
est protected by the first-sale doctrine: the promotion of entrepre-
neurship and innovation. 7 9 A robust secondary market creates
opportunities for entrepreneurs to create businesses, such as used-
book stores, thrift stores, and used-record stores, thereby expanding
the economy. 80 Secondary markets also indirectly help to expand the
economy. Existing small businesses that do not have vast stores of
capital to invest in the newest software for their businesses can still
purchase the less expensive secondhand software that, while perhaps
outdated, nevertheless helps these small businesses become more effi-
cient and competitive.18'
Libraries are likewise at significant risk by a contraction of the first-
sale doctrine because they regularly partake in the practice of lending
and distributing copyrighted works. Libraries deserve special mention
in a discussion of the benefits of a secondary market, as they occupy a
unique position in the public conscience as bastions of free informa-
tion and proponents of the proliferation of knowledge. The American
Library Association (ALA) also filed amicus briefs on behalf of Mr.
Vernor.182 In its brief, the ALA emphasized the "two lives" of a given
copyrighted work: "After their in-print lives end, it is libraries,
archives . . . and [other] second-hand markets that continue to make
these titles available and accessible." 1 8 3 After all, "it is difficult to
conceptualize the lifecycle of most copyrighted works without imagin-
ing copies being lent, resold, or gifted. Without a robust first sale doc-
trine, however, each of these activities would be imperiled by a
copyright owner's distribution right."184
In short, the existence of robust secondary markets promotes both
greater economic efficiency and the broader dissemination of knowl-
edge. When the first-sale doctrine is contracted, it threatens secon-
dary markets and the benefits they provide because it restricts
consumers' right to alienate their property. Without the alienation
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
179. Brief of eBay Inc., supra note 168, at 9-10.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 7-10.
182. See Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Library Ass'n et al. in Support of Plaintiff, Vernor v.
Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-35969), 2010 WL 894740 [hereinafter Brief
of ALA].
183. Id. at 9.
184. Id. at 7-8.
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rights that the first-sale doctrine ensures, secondary markets could be-
come a thing of the past.
B. Application of the Vernor Test to Other Forms of
Copyrighted Intellectual Property
Another likely outcome of the Ninth Circuit's approach to owner-
ship of copies of copyrighted works is the application of the Vernor
test to other forms of intellectual property. While the Vernor test ap-
plies explicitly to software,185 it could be difficult for courts to confine
its application to intellectual property only in that form, particularly
because other media is increasingly digitized and distributed over the
Internet.186 Examples of this include music from popular services
such as iTunes or Rhapsody, and e-books from Barnes & Noble and
Amazon.com. If the Vernor test is applied beyond the realm of com-
puter software, "[tiomorrow's vendors of digital music, movies, and e-
books could use 'license agreements' to impose whatever post-sale use
and transfer restrictions might suit their fancy, secure in the knowl-
edge that they could pursue copyright infringement remedies against
any transgressors." 8 7
While the Vernor test could most easily be applied to other media in
digital form, the rule is not, ultimately, confined to the digital arena.
In fact, there is nothing preventing courts from applying the rule to
physical media like paper books, DVD copies of films, or CDs con-
taining music. The ALA, in its amicus brief on behalf of Mr. Vernor,
noted this concern. 88 It argued that the Vernor test requires nothing
more from copyright owners than the invocation of a few "magic
words" in contractual "license agreements" in order to evade the first-
sale doctrine.189 Once they do, "there is no limiting principle that
would prevent other copyright owners from employing the same trick
on books, CDs, DVDs, and other media."190
If such an application of the Vernor test occurred, the first-sale doc-
trine would deteriorate into a shell of its former self. Consider the
facts of the seminal first-sale doctrine case, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus.191 If the Vernor test had applied to the Bobbs-Merrill context,
185. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111.
186. For example, Amazon.com's Kindle e-book reader allows access to over one million digi-
tal copies of books, in addition to several newspapers and magazines, and over two million out-
of-copyright, pre-1923 books.
187. Brief of ALA, supra note 182, at 22.
188. See id. at 3-4.
189. Id. at 3.
190. Id.
191. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
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it would have likely resulted in a determination in favor of the copy-
right owner. In Bobbs-Merrill, the copyright owner printed the fol-
lowing text in the book: "The price of this book at retail is $1 net. No
dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will
be treated as an infringement of the copyright." 92 This "license" sat-
isfies all three elements of the Vernor test: the copyright owner speci-
fied that the user is granted a license (by calling it the same);
significantly restricted the user's ability to transfer the software (by
limiting the price of the book); and imposed notable use restrictions
on the user.193 Consequently, if Bobbs-Merrill were decided today in
a Vernor jurisdiction, the opposite outcome would likely result.
The danger, of course, is that all intellectual property would eventu-
ally become inalienable. In a worst-case scenario, every used-book
store would close down, libraries would be facing constant copyright
infringement lawsuits, and, if one wanted to lend a copy of a good
book to a friend, either they would need to get express permission
from the copyright owner or the friend would have to purchase her
own book. Students at all levels of academia would be prohibited
from purchasing lower cost, used textbooks and likewise would be un-
able to sell the books back to the university bookstore once the se-
mester was over, further stretching a student's already limited budget.
While this doomsday scenario seems entirely unappetizing, the simple
truth is that the Vernor test could allow exactly that. The broad defer-
ence granted to the copyright owner and his license agreements by the
Vernor test is in contravention to the first-sale doctrine and the neces-
sary limits-of a copyright owner's powers promoted in Bobbs-Merrill.
C. The Consumer Backlash
The contraction of consumer rights of alienability and the applica-
tion of the Vernor test to media beyond computer software would
likely result in a consumer backlash against the producers and retail-
ers of such restricted media. The consumer's power in a capitalist eco-
nomic model lies in their ability to vote with their wallets; if something
is unappealing they can simply choose not to buy it.
There already exists today a large library of free software that grew
out of the work of independent computer programmers and academ-
ics in a movement that promotes "open-source" software.194 These
programs perform many of the same functions as their expensive,
192. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 341 (1908).
193. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111.
194. See About the Open Source Initiative, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://www.opensource.
org/about (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
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commercial counterparts.' 95 Some open-source programs have be-
come the standard over their professionally made, restricted
equivalents. In Europe, for example, the popular open-source In-
ternet browser Mozilla Firefox has recently overtaken Microsoft's In-
ternet Explorer as the most popular web browser. 196 In the United
States, Internet Explorer still enjoys a majority of the market share, 197
but that popularity has been steadily declining since at least 2008.198
The open-source movement has been growing steadily, and this is
likely to continue to expand in the face of the Vernor decision.
Unlike their commercial counterparts, open-source programs are
subject only to general public licenses. 199 These licenses reduce re-
strictions on the transferability and modification of software rather
than expanding those restrictions like the more-common software li-
cense agreements drafted by software developers. 200 The Open
Source Initiative promulgates a list of ten recommended criteria for
such licenses. 201 It recommends, among other provisions, granting li-
cense to freely redistribute the software, to leave the source code
open for others to view and edit, and to permit the creation of deriva-
tive works.202
As demonstrated by the success of the web browser Mozilla Firefox,
open-source programs are certainly capable of encroaching on the
market share of their commercial counterparts. If the courts continue
to constrict the rights of consumers and extend the Vernor test to
other media, consumers will likely turn to open-source alternatives to
satisfy their needs. This would create a serious problem for the
software industry because they would, ironically, drive their customers
into the waiting arms of their competitors while attempting to protect
the integrity of their business. They are in danger of pulling the pro-
verbial rug out from underneath themselves.
195. For example, Open Office is one alternative to Microsoft's popular Microsoft Office suite
of programs. See Why OpenOffice.org, OPENOFFICE.ORG, http://why.openoffice.org (last visited
Jan. 28, 2011).
196. See Top 5 Browsers in Europe from July 2008 to January 2012, STATCOUNTER
GLoBALSTATs, http://gs.statcounter.com/#browser-eu-monthly-200807-201101 (last visited Jan.
29, 2012).
197. See Top 5 Browsers in the United States from July 2008 to January 2012, STATCOUNTER
GLOBALSTATS, http://gs.statcounter.com/#browser-US-monthly-200807-201101 (last visited Jan.
29, 2012).
198. Id.
199. See The Open Source Definition, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://www.opensource.org/
docs/osd (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Vernor decision is a sudden lurch in the long history of the
development of copyright law. The first-sale doctrine and the essen-
tial-step defense were created by the judiciary and Congress to protect
the interests of consumers while curbing the potentially limitless
power granted to copyright owners. With its decision in Vernor, the
Ninth Circuit threatens over one hundred years of precedent restrict-
ing the otherwise limitless power of copyright owners. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's influence on issues of intellectual property now places the entire
nation under the same threat. The Supreme Court should review the
Vernor test in order to make the law of the nation more consistent.
The Supreme Court must balance the interests of consumers against
the interests of producers of the intellectual property when it ad-
dresses the important issue of what it means to be the owner of a copy
of a copyrighted work. The Court should not be persuaded by the
Ninth Circuit's nondiscetionary Vernor test. Likewise, the Court
should not be persuaded by jurisdictions like the District of Utah that
apply a similarly absolute approach granting blind deference to the
software consumer. Rather, the Supreme Court ought to look to the
flexible rule promulgated by the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit's
rule is not so rigid as to disenfranchise software consumers from their
property rights, but it is clear and predictable enough to protect the
producers of software from the real economic problems of piracy and
prohibited reproduction.
Adopting the Ninth Circuit's rigid approach would have three detri-
mental effects on the country and its citizenry: consumers' alienability
rights would be threatened; the rigid Vernor test would likely be ex-
tended to forms of intellectual property other than computer
software; and combination of the two effects above would cause a
backlash from the consumer.
All in all, the Supreme Court should adopt something similar to the
Second and Federal Circuits' approaches to the question of ownership
of digital media because they provide a more balanced alternative to
the Ninth Circuit's Vernor test. A test that permits a balancing be-
tween the interests of the software-producing industry and the
software-consuming citizenry is preferable to a test that absolutely
collapses on the side of one or the other.
Zbigniew I. Bednarz*
* J.D. Candidate 2013, DePaul University College of Law. The author would like to thank
his mother, father, two sisters, and the rest of his loving family and friends, who have been
966 [Vol. 61:939
2012] UNREAL PROPERTY 967
incredibly supportive throughout the entire process of writing this Note. Furthermore, the au-
thor would like to thank attorneys Matthew J. Belcher and Cesar Orozco, and the rest of the
staff at the Belcher Law Office in Chicago, Illinois for their encouragement, support, and help in
the drafting of this Note. Lastly, the author would like to thank attorneys Mary Hutchings Reed
and Sara Skinner Chubb at Winston & Strawn LLP in Chicago, Illinois for their valuable practi-
tioner's perspective on this problem and helpful insight in proofreading this Note before
publication.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:939968
